BAGHDAD, Iraq – Coalition forces discovered a large amount
of documents and videos ranging from plans to critiques, including al-Qaida in
Iraq’s strategy in Baghdad during an April 16 raid in the Yusifiyah area.
The documents show how the terrorist organization lacks leadership, military
capability and Iraqi support.
“This information confirms what the Government of Iraq, Coalition forces and
ultimately the people of Iraq already know - that al-Qaida in Iraq’s role only
attempts to impede Iraqis in following the road to prosperity, security and
national unity,” said Brig. Gen. Rudy Wright, Multi-National Force – Iraq
spokesman
After discovering these documents, the translated versions were sent to
Coalition forces’ leadership for analysis.
The al-Qaida author of the “Baghdad Strategy” and the “Baghdad State of
Affairs” is unknown, but officials think he is a significant leader within the
terrorist organization.
The latter memorandum outlines al-Qaida terrorists in Iraq have no strategy,
that the ‘…mujahideen are not considered more than a daily annoyance to the
Shiite government…’, and that the ‘…mujahideen in Baghdad are generally groups
of assassins without any organized military capabilities.’
According to the translated al-Qaida documents, the Mujahideen’s only power
lies in surprise ‘hit and run’ attacks, or setting up explosive charges and
booby traps that predominantly target civilian men, women and children.
“The actions of the Iraqi Security Forces are having a significant negative
impact on the Mujahideen’s ability to operate in Baghdad. Al-Qaida in Iraq
attacks Mosques and other public places to draw media attention and is having
difficulty recruiting members because the people of Iraq do not support its
cause,”said the author who translated the Baghdad State of Affairs document.
Here is the englesh tranlation of the document: (so you can make up your own
conclusions)
Page 1 of
4
A glance at the
reality of Baghdad in light of the latest events (sectarian
turmoil)
- It has been proven that the Shiites have a
power and influence in Baghdad that
cannot be taken lightly, particularly when the power of the Ministries of Interior and Defense
is given to them, compared with the power of the mujahidin in Baghdad. During a
military confrontation, they will be in a better position because they represent
the power of the state along with the power of the popular militias. Most of the mujahidin power lies in
surprise attacks (hit and run) or setting up explosive charges and booby traps.
This is a different matter than a battle with organized forces that possess
machinery and suitable communications networks. Thus, what is fixed in the minds
of the Shiite and Sunni population is that the Shiites are stronger in Baghdad
and closer to controlling it while the mujahidin (who represent the backbone of
the Sunni people) are not considered more than a daily annoyance to the Shiite
government. The only power the
mujahidin have is what they have already demonstrated in hunting down drifted
patrols and taking sniper shots at those patrol members who stray far from their
patrols, or planting booby traps among the citizens and hiding among them in the
hope that the explosions will injure an American or members of the
government. In other words, these
activities could be understood as hitting the scared and the hiding ones, which
is an image that requires a concerted effort to change, as well as Allah’s
wisdom.
- The strength of the brothers in Baghdad is
built mainly on booby trapped cars, and most of the mujahidin groups in Baghdad
are generally groups of assassin without any organized military
capabilities.
- There is a clear absence of organization among the groups
of the brothers in Baghdad, whether at the leadership level in Baghdad, the
brigade leaders, or their groups therein.
Coordination among them is very difficult, which appears clearly when the
group undertake a join operations
- The policy followed by the brothers in
Baghdad is a media oriented policy without a clear comprehensive plan to capture
an area or an enemy center. Other word, the significance of the strategy of
their work is to show in the media that the American and the government do not
control the situation and there is resistance against them. This policy dragged us to the type of
operations that are attracted to the media, and we go to the streets from time
to time for more possible noisy operations which follow the same
direction.
This direction
has large positive effects; however, being preoccupied with it alone delays more
important operations such as taking control of some areas, preserving it and
assuming power in Baghdad (for example, taking control of a university, a hospital, or a Sunni
religious site).
Page 2 of
4
At the same time,
the Americans and the Government were able to absorb our painful blows, sustain
them, compensate their losses with new replacements, and follow strategic plans
which allowed them in the past few years to take control of Baghdad as well as
other areas one after the other.
That is why every year is worse than the previous year as far as the
Mujahidin’s control and influence over Baghdad. .
- The role that the Islamic party and the
Islamic Scholars Committee play in numbing the Sunni people through the media is
a dangerous role. It has been
proven from the course of the events that the American investment in the Party
and the Committee were not in vain.
In spite of the gravity of
the events, they were able to calm down the Sunni people, justify the enemy
deeds, and give the enemy the opportunity to do more work without any recourse
and supervision. This situation stemmed from two
matters:
n
First, their media power is presented by their special
radio and TV stations as the sole Sunni information source, coupled with our
weak media which is confined mainly to the Internet, without a flyer or
newspaper to present these events.
n
Second, in the course of their control of the majority of
the speakers at mosques who convert right into wrong and wrong into right, and
present Islam in a sinful manner and sins in a Muslim manner. At the same time we did not have any
positive impact or benefits from our
operations.
- The mujahidin do not have any stored weapons
and ammunition in their possession in Baghdad, particularly rockets, such as C5K
Katyosha or bomber or mortars which we realized their importance and shortage in
Baghdad. That was due to lack of
check and balance, and proper follow-ups.
- The National Guard status is frequently
raised and whether they belong to the Sunnis or Shiites. Too much talk is around
whether we belong to them or not,
or should we strike and kill their men or
not?
It is believed that
this matter serves the Americans very well. I believe that the Committee and the
Party are pushing this issue because they want to have an influence, similar to
the Mujahidin’s. When and if a Sunni units from the National Guard are formed,
and begin to compete with the mujahidin and squeeze them, we will have a
problem; we either let them go beyond the limits or fight them and risk inciting the Sunnis
against us through the Party’s and the Committee’s channels.
Page 3 of
4
I believe that we should not allow this
situation to exist at all, and we should bury it before it surfaces and reject
any suggestion to that effect.
- (Salah), the military commander of Baghdad
(he used to be the commander of the Rassafah County and still is) is a
courageous young man with a good determination but he has little and simple
experience in the military field and does not have a clear vision about the
current stage and how to deal with it Most of his work at al-Rassafah
County is to take cars to the Jubur Arab Tribes, convert them into booby traps
and take them back inside Baghdad for explosion. And the more booby trap cars he makes,
the more success he has. This alone
is not a work plan and we do not benefit from it in the medium range let alone
the long range.
- (Salah): The current commander of Northern
al-Karkh (Abu-Huda) is very concerned because of his deteriorating security
situation caused by being pursued by the Americans, since they have his picture
and voice print. Therefore, his
movement is very restricted and he is unable to do anything here. We should
remove him from Baghdad to a location where he can work easier; otherwise he is
closer to become totally ineffective.
I know nothing about his past military experience or organizational
skills.
- (Salah): Northern
al-Karkh groups are estimated at 40 mujahid, so is the Southern Karkh. They could double that number if
necessary. Al-Rassafah groups in
general is estimated at 30 mujahidin as I was informed by the commander of
al-Rassafah. These are very small numbers compared to the tens of thousands of
the enemy troops. How can we
increase these numbers?
Page 4 of
4
Blank
End of
Document/Translation
I find this very intereting information, especially since many say we
have lost this war, its time to pull out, its a failure. LOL Gues someone forget
to tell the terrorist that.
